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Abstract 
Transfer is involved in ah learning, remembering, problem solving and cognitive activities. 
Thus we need to think of dimensions and extent of transfer rather than simply consider transfer 
versus non-transfer. Moreover, we should consider transfer of motivation as well as transfer of 
learned cognitions if we are to understand transfer of learning in educational situations and be 
helpful to educators. Metacognitive, as well as cognitive, strategies are useful in facilitating 
transfer in many situations even though they may overload or interfere with transfer in situa- 
tions where automatized responses are appropriate. We need research to determine when 
metacognition should be called into play. Research is also needed on the interaction of cogni- 
tive and motivational variables affecting transfer. 
Introduction 
Transfer is paradoxical. When we want it, we do not get it. Yet it occurs all of the time. Fre- 
quently we fail to recognize it because we hide it under other names. As Voss (this issue) 
points out, all learning and remembering involves transfer. We never use learning in 
exactly the same situation in which we have learned it. Even in the laboratory, recall is in 
a different context than that in which the original learning occurred, for neither the situa- 
tion nor the learner can be held constant. Time does not stand still. The learner has 
changed even if only a short time has lapsed since the original learning. In non-laboratory 
settings, of course, the changes are much greater. Rather than a sharp boundary we have 
transfer dimensions. All use of learning involves transfer. 
We ordinarily think of transfer as the use of previous learning in a situation somewhat 
different from the situation in which learning took place. But, just as Mayer and Green0 
(1972) differentiated between “near” and “far” transfer, I would argue that transfer is in- 
volved in situations that range from very little, to very great differences from the learning 
situation. If someone responds in a relatively skillful or habitual way, we say that this is evi- 
dence of learning or remembering. If the situation is at least superficially different from the 
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original situation we say that transfer has occurred. If the needed response is not obvious, 
we describe the behavior asprobfem solving. And, if learning is applied in a situation very 
different from that in which it was learned we describe it as creativity. 
Pea (this issue) has made the important point that one of the constraints on the external 
validity of laboratory studies of transfer and problem solving is that the experimenter as- 
sumes motivation for the task. In natural settings motivation differs from situation to situ- 
ation and from individual to individual. I was particularly interested in the methods used 
to elicit motivation in the studies reported in the preceding chapters. For example, Voss’s 
real problems in contemporary society, and Pea’s real world, “hands on”, problems seem 
well-chosen for motivational as well as cognitive attributes. 
Metacognition 
What is the role of metacognition? In my course, “Learning to Learn”, I emphasize be- 
coming aware of one’s own learning skills and strategies. My assumption is that students 
will be more effective learners if they are aware of alternative strategies and can choose an 
alternative if their first attempt is not working well. In this issue Voss, Spada, and Salomon 
all suggest that teaching metacognition may interfere with, rather than facilitate, effective 
performance. “Low-road” transfer in Salomon’s terms may be more effective than mind- 
ful, “high-road” transfer in most situations. 
This is a valid concern, but it seems to me not to be that of metacognition versus no 
metacognition. Rather the question is: When is metacognition useful? In early stages of 
learning, introducing conceptual, metacognitive elements may simply add another confus- 
ing element to an already difficult learning situation; later introduction of metacognition 
and explicit verbalization may facilitate the integration and transfer of skills; still later, 
when skills have been automatized, introducing metacognition may interfere with smooth, 
skillful performance. In this sense metacognition is like problem solving. 
Elshout (1987) described a region of problematicity: if one thinks of problems as ranging 
from very easy to unsolvable, there is a region containing problems to which the problem 
solver can respond more or less automatically using well-learned algorithms or proce- 
dures. Problems involving complexities or barriers not easily handled by routine proce- 
dures fall into a middle region of problematicity, and beyond this region lie problems so 
difficult that the problem solver has no algorithms or heuristics to apply and is lost. Simi- 
larly we might describe Elshout’s middle region as a region of “metacognicity” in which the 
learner needs to consider alternative strategies for the use of previous learning. 
The point is that different processes may be useful at different stages of learning. This 
generalization is also likely to apply to the use of different mental images or representa- 
tions of concepts, such as the mathematical concepts discussed by Putnam (this issue). His 
suggestion that children be exposed to a variety of representations seems well-grounded. 
We need research on how many, and what kinds of, representations are useful for which 
students at which stages of learning. 
Teaching for Transfer 
Each contributor to this issue has given some suggestions about how we can teach for 
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transfer. Voss warns against teaching weak methods separately from content instruction; 
Spada suggests providing an environment that will support hypothesis formation and 
searches for relevant information; Pea admonishes us to wean students from dependence 
on the teacher and to help them practice their skills across multiple domains. Only Salo- 
mon and Globerson advocate a directive approach with the teacher actively guiding in- 
struction. Salomon and Globerson recommend practice for “low road” automatic transfer 
and mindful abstractbn for “high road,” thoughtful transfer. The instructional procedures 
emphasizing these two roads to transfer seem to fit both with theory and previous research. 
As most of the papers in this issue point out, spontaneous transfer is not nearly as fre- 
quent as one would expect, even with the best of instruction. In reading Salomon and 
Globerson’s paper, I nodded agreement with their statement that low road transfer de- 
pends on amount of practice and variability of context, and, like them, I feel that we still 
need to go beyond the major principles they suggest. Similarly 1 applaud Putnam’s sugges- 
tion that students should both practice doing mathematics and talk about mathematical 
procedures and concepts. Whether we emphasize common elements, verbalization of 
meaningful understanding, analogical reasoning or any of the other approaches to the con- 
ditions affecting transfer, we are still looking primarily at the original learning and later 
transfer situations and the learner’s use of knowledge acquired in the original situation. 
Could we not move to another level? In analyzing learning outcomes I have emphasized 
the fact that teachers are both teaching knowledge at a basic level and simultaneously 
teaching skills and strategies for learning (McKeachie, 1986). Similarly, could we not teach 
skills and knowledge and at the same time teach mindful transferability? 
The problem that remains, as I see it, is not just one of the relationships between the 
knowledge or skill learned and the knowledge or skill demanded in the transfer situation. 
Rather, I would ask whether or not it is possible to develop metacognitive skills or strate- 
gies that facilitate transfer of a variety of previously learned concepts and skills to a variety 
of new situations. In short, can we teach learners to think about, or be mindful of, any pre- 
vious knowledge that may be relevant when they encounter a problem? Can we teach 
transfer habits, transfer heuristics, or transfer motives that transcend specific situations? 
Pea’s description of culturally-influenced categorization systems of problem types ap- 
proaches this notion of “transfer skill” or “metacognitive strategies for transfer”. Voss’s 
description of categorization in transfer of knowledge for problem solving is, also, I be- 
lieve, an example of the sort of metacognitive transfer strategy to which I refer. Can it be 
that one of the secrets of transfer is the ability to see broad, inclusive categories whose ele- 
ments have common dimensions? As Pea implies the expert has a much richer and more 
complex knowledge base from which to create such categories and to recognize the 
similarities and differences between the source and target situations. 
What are the skills to be taught? Can we teach Salomon and Globerson’s mindfulness 
or Pea’s transfer attitude as skills that lead to high road transfer? I suspect that this is not 
easy and not likely to result from a single course. But it may well be that attention given 
to transfer in several courses would have a lasting, transferable effect. Moreover, giving a 
conceptual understanding of why mindfulness and other skills are useful, should promote 
high road transfer. 
Perhaps self-monitoring skill is also a candidate for consistent teaching in several 
courses as a general skill for facilitating transfer. It is one of the most basic metacognitive 
skills - one with applications in learning and problem-solving situations of all kinds. De 
Corte and Verschaffel(l981) have already demonstrated success in teaching children self- 
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monitoring in arithmetic. Pea (this issue) has stressed the importance of the learner’s self- 
concept and motivation as variables determining transfer, and it is likely that they are par- 
ticularly important in self-monitoring. Why do learners or problem solvers fail to check to 
see if they understand a learning task, or to determine whether their solution to a problem 
is correct? It may well be that failure of self-monitoring is due tofenr that one will discover 
that one is wrong. If a learner is already confused, lacking in self-esteem, and hoping to get 
away from the task as rapidly as possible, getting a poor grade later is less painful than find- 
ing that one has not understood and must start over. 
Motivation for Transfer 
We usually think of transfer as involving cognitive skills. but I am intrigued by the pos- 
sibility of transfer of motivation and by Pea’s broader notion of creating cultures of trans- 
fer thinking. While motivation theory typically involves an interaction of person and situ- 
ation variables, it also has incorporated individual difference variables believed to charac- 
terize individuals across some range of situations. Such motivational variables as need for 
achievement, self-competence, and internal locus of control are thought of as learned and 
learnable, yet relatively stable and generalizable across situations involving achievement 
standards. If we can develop achievement motivation, a sense of self-competence. and 
other aspects of motivation for learning, we might be facilitating the development of im- 
portant transferable human characteristics that would, in turn, increase the likelihood of 
transfer of cognitive skills. Although one’s sense of self-competence may vary across do- 
mains of achievement, most Students have self-perceptions of their own general intelli- 
gence and their gene& competence in learning and problem solving. 
One of the variables that should affect “mindfulness”, in Salomon and Globerson’s 
terms, is the individual’s motivation and sense of self-competence. Unmotivated learners 
are likely to withdraw or proceed mindlessly; anxious learners are likely to regress to sim- 
ple trial-and-error; hopeless learners give up. Sternberg (1986) suggest that either too little 
or too much self-confidence can be a stumbling block to the use of intellectual skills. Too 
much self confidence can lead to mindlessness, and too little to withdrawal; for mindful 
transfer to take place, learners and problem solvers need to have sufficient self-compe- 
tence and achievement motivation to tackle and stick to the task involving transfer. 
Metacognitive processes are probably relevant to motivation. It seems reasonable to hypo- 
thesize that learners who are aware of alternative strategies are likely to have higher expec- 
tations for success than those who simply tackle a task without thinking. Moreover aware- 
ness of alternatives affects flexibility, a key component of intellectual ability. 
In addition to general motivational aspects of personality, such as self-competence. 
motivational strategies may also be candidates for teaching. The strategy of breaking long- 
term goals into related intermediate and immediate goals might well transfer to a variety 
of transfer situations. 
Knowledge and Intelligence 
Almost all modern accounts of learning and problem solving point to the importance of 
domain-specific knowledge. The chief point of contention between those who advocate 
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teaching cognitive skills directly and those who argue that it is only profitable to teach skills 
in connection with a given domain of knowledge is in the transferability of the skills. I 
argue that one of the relevant issues in this debate is the degree to which metacognitive 
processes are learned. Success in transfer depends on analyzing situations and determining 
which skills are relevant. Certainly an important dimension differentiating situations for 
an individual is the amount of domain-specific knowledge he or she has in each situation. 
Some skills or principles may be relevant in domains in which one has much previous 
knowledge; others may be relevant for domains in which one has little prior knowledge. 
Both Spada and Voss (this issue) deal with knowledge application in solving new prob- 
lems - in Spada’s case, ecological knowledge, and, in Voss’s case, knowledge of political 
science and economics. Voss stresses that in order to recognize the possibility of transfer, 
one must categorize problems so that the similarities between previous problems and the 
current problem are apparent. Voss distinguishes two aspects of transfer that are illus- 
trated by Putnam’s point (this issue) that we expect mathematics learning to transfer both 
to the learning of more advanced mathematics and to a variety of practical problems in 
everyday life. It is little wonder that some students fail to recognize the transferability of 
their learning in situations so phenomenally different. And, as Pea and Voss suggests (this 
issue), there is also a failure to transfer prior practical learning to formal education. 
The problem is that even when people recognize their need for knowledge they may not 
see that knowledge they have is relevant. Spada studies the ways in which subjects recog- 
nize such needs for knowledge and the processes used in seeking and using it in a dynamic 
situation involving the interaction of several variables. It would be particularly interesting 
to test subjects on all three of Spada’s experimental settings to determine what knowledge 
and skills transferred from one experiment to another. Do they now access relevant knowl- 
edge and skills more flexibly? Can we teach students to see school learning as part of every- 
day life? 
Conclusion 
As I read these papers, I could not help thinking of discussions of the “g” factor in intel- 
ligence which is characterized by flexibility. Very likely the skills described by ‘.g” include 
those we have discussed here under the rubric “transfer”. 
Spada’s conclusion is a good summary of all the papers; that is, transfer depends upon 
domain-specific knowledge, general cognitive skills, and goals and values. We can facili- 
tate that transfer by labeling and verbalizing the processes involved and eventually move 
toward Pea’s vision of a culture of transfer thinking. To undergird educational progress we 
need research that deals not only with cognitive aspects of transfer but also with the in- 
teracting motivational cognitions that determine whether or not learners actually transfer 
the learning potentially transferable. The concepts of learned helplessness, self-efficacy, 
and self-regulated learning - concepts prominent in the domain of research on educa- 
tional motivation-need now to be integrated with our more bloodless cognitive concepts 
in studies linking laboratory research with research in educational settings. 
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